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Abstract
Legal pluralism has become common currency in many contemporary debates on law and
globalization. Its main claim is that a form of global legal pluralism represents both the most
accurate description of law in times of globalization and the best normative option. On the descriptive
level, global legal pluralism is considered more reliable than state-based accounts. On the normative
level, global legal pluralism is understood as a possibility to open up the legal realm to previously
unheard voices. This article assesses these claims against the background of classic legal-pluralist
scholarship. After reconstructing the emergence of global legal pluralism and then examining
its epistemic and normative versions, the last two sections identify the shortcoming of this approach
by underlining the absence of what the authors call ‘a sense of self-suspicion’ in drawing the map
of legalities in the global sphere. The main argument put forward is that global legal pluralism is
oblivious of a few key insights offered by the founding fathers of classic legal pluralism.
Keywords: legal pluralism; global administrative law; liberal political theory; legal authority;
symbolic power
Countless authors today seize upon the lexicon of pluralism and use bits and pieces
of legal-pluralist scholarship to overcome the impasses of mainstream legal theories
vis-a`-vis the deep metamorphoses of domestic legal systems. The jargon of pluralism
has become both the symptom of a failure and the signpost to a new mindset: the
failure of grand legal narratives based on the assumption that the state is the
condition of possibility for any orderly society, and the mindset of the new generation
of legal theorists who do not completely disavow such legal narratives, but bemoan
their incapacity to come to grips with today’s globalized legal theatre. Yesterday’s
world was an archipelago of secluded islands with a legal order of their own; today’s
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world is a structured skeleton of interconnected territories, where legal languages
fuse, private orderings mushroom, and traditional, clear-cut vertical hierarchies give
way to horizontal negotiations of different sorts. To account for the fuzziness of
today’s reality, a new vocabulary is needed, one that accommodates phenomena such
as hybridity,1 indigeneity,2 interlegality,3 semi-autonomy,4 unofficiality,5 and others,
nicely captured by the pluralist semantic repertoire. A strong, critical emphasis is
placed by neo-pluralist authors on the thick substantialism of traditional constitu-
tional theories, as these exhibit permanent traces of the outdated ideologies of
nationalism and collectivism. With an eye to getting rid of static, monistic, centra-
listic understandings of law, neo-pluralist theories extol the multiplication of sources
and the waning of vertical axes of command, and call for a resolute and full-hearted
acceptance of the irretrievable hyper-pluralism of global legal reality.
However, if we go back to the forerunners of legal pluralism, we are faced with a
different attitude. It can hardly be denied that former generations of pluralists were
hasty in raising bold political claims and in leveling vociferous accusations at the
hegemonic despotism of mainstream legal theories. Nevertheless, the theoretical
arguments they put forward carried with themselves what might be called a ‘sense of
self-suspicion’, which seems to be absent in contemporary theories. This sense of
self-suspicion concerned the performative force that theories inevitably exert on their
subject and the violence of conceptual categories which claim to be reporting matters
of fact, whereas, in reality, they contribute to the production of these very facts.
Accordingly, the main criticism that former legal pluralists made to that which they
regarded as the myopia of state-centered theories was that the latter, whether
wittingly or not, (also) pursued political goals and were (also) party to a political
agenda: mainstream legal theories claimed to be describing a reality that they actively
contributed to shaping in reference to the categories that the theories were producing
and applying. In stark contrast with the professed allegiance to descriptive methods,
mainstream legal theories tended to objectify and reify entities that, in several
respects, were at odds with the categories produced at the theoretical level. This
tendency was not due to the fact that mainstream legal theorists deliberately wanted
to reify and objectify entities in order to justify the naturalness of something which
had a fabricated character. Instead, the root of this tendency lay in the fact that
theories always exert ‘effects of reality’ on what they account for. It is this basic
premise that led former legal pluralists to be self-suspicious: Could it not be the case
that they were inadvertently pursuing political goals, alternative to those of state-
centered theories? Could it not be the case that pluralists’ theoretical claims were
inadvertently serving the purposes of another political agenda?
This awareness is plainly visible in some of the most compelling contributions to
classic legal pluralism (hereinafter CLP), that is, Sally Falk Moore’s inquiry into semi-
autonomous social fields,6 Sally Engle Merry’s reconceptualization of legal plural-
ism,7 and Marc Galanter’s analysis of indigenous law.8 With different intents and
through different paths, their analysis of the relationship between the official and the
unofficial elements of the legal phenomenon were meant to stress three key points
that, all things considered, are shared by most erstwhile advocates of legal pluralism.
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First, theorists must be aware of their ethnocentric bent, whereby a given reality
comes to be perceived and described through the homogenizing prism of a specific
cultural tradition. Secondly, legal constructs as well as legal tools emerge out of a geo-
historically bounded experience, much as legal theorists tend to project the conceptual
contents of this experience on what falls outside its scope and to provide an account of
the latter with the limited heuristic force of culture-specific paradigms. Thirdly, based
on the first and the second points, the idea that there is such thing as the homolingual
discourse of the law, which is able to penetrate all social interstices and to mould
all social realities, is to be rejected. Law is not just one entity which can be described
and encapsulated into a set of theoretical statements, but a complex frame where
negotiations of different sorts take place, to the extent that one can hardly determine
what law is in the here and now unless one pays due heed to how the actors involved
make use of the law.
At the same time, the insights of these three pioneers of CLP shed light on the
tendency of mainstream legal theories to de-historicize legal reality (which, needless
to say, is the flip side of the concealment of the performative force of theorizing).
State-centered legal theories tended to ignore that the tapestry of legal history is full of
examples of legal regimes and juridico-political experiences which can hardly be
squared with the allegedly universal categories deployed by legal theorists. However,
such a lack of historical sensitivity had infiltrated the consciousness of legal theorists to
such an extent that, when they spoke of legal experiences taking place outside the
Western province, they were undecided as to whether non-Western populations had no
law at all or had rudimentary forms of law.9 Be this as it may, this instinctive theoretical
conviction was used as the basis to justify hierarchies in the alleged evolution from
elementary to full-fledged legal systems. Moore, Galanter and Merry did nothing but
voice the quasi-obvious claim that hierarchical visions of the law are not simply
mistaken when it comes to non-Western contexts. Much more importantly, they
hamper a sound understanding of Western legal systems. If the de-historicized,
hierarchical vision of the law served as an ideological weapon, instrumental in the
takeover of the legal field on the part of state institutions,10 it certainly made life harder
for those who aspired to understand how law works in social life.
The issue we would like to tackle in this paper is whether or not the emerging
strand of global legal pluralism (hereinafter GLP) can aspire to be the heir of CLP or,
as we believe, is rather an updated version of conventional legal narratives, affixed to
a liberal understanding of conflict.11 To achieve that, we will first address the nature
of GLP and will then bring to light some of its drawbacks. Finally, we will explain
why the exponents of CLP still have an important lesson to teach us when we
approach the global legal and political scenario.
THE EMERGENCE OF GLP
As noted by many commentators,12 globalization, coupled with the rise of global
governance, transnational law, and supranational law, has shaken the common
understanding of law as essentially on a par with the sovereignty of the state. In effect,
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the current standard narrative interprets these developments in terms of a progres-
sive decline of states’ sovereignty.13 It should be noted that, while this descriptive
statement does not concern directly the development of legal pluralism, it clearly
points to the opening up of new possibilities for law and legal theory outside the
framework of state law. The creation of supranational bodies (WTO, NAFTA, the EU
and many others) and the increased mobility of capital, information, and people have
put state-based understanding of legality under huge pressure. These developments
have forced scholars to bring into question conventional accounts of political
legitimacy and the legal order.14 GLP is a strand of pluralist thinking whose aim is
to extend pluralist insights into the globalized legal realm in order to get rid of the
traditional state-centrism of legal theory and to provide sounder knowledge of new
legal phenomena. However, despite GLP’s allegiance to the vocabulary of CLP, much
of the latter’s redemptive qualities have not been taken up.
The main concern of this new wave of pluralism is not with the subjection,
colonization, or the exploitation of dominated populations of the Global South and the
role official law plays in these processes. On the contrary, GLP’s main preoccupation
seems to be with how to make sense of existing legal networks, or better, networks
comprised of entities whose legal or quasi-legal nature was already (de jure or de facto)
acknowledged. Accordingly, issues arising outside the bounded realm of the national
state have been treated either as a matter of governance or as a question of conflicts
among different authorities.15 The former case is properly illustrated by the use of non-
strictly legal forms of regulation in the context of the governance on the Internet.
Mainstream scholarship turned to alternative sources of regulation such as markets
and architecture.16 The whole debate started by focusing on the question of controlling
and disciplining, while its main focus was the interactions among citizens in the digital
realm. In other words, the issues raised by new digital technologies (and the Internet in
particular) have been managed as questions of governance of conduct based on the
dogmas of regulation. By the same token, conflicts among authorities have been mostly
regarded as cases of so-called ‘same domain plurality’, that is, cases where there are two
or more authorities in the same domain of activity (or ‘when more than one person/
body is authoritative for the same subjects in relation to the same field of activity’17).
In this context, some of the problems tackled by GLP, as we will explain in more detail
below, remind of international private law and conflict of laws approaches.
An important factor to be taken into account for explaining GLP concerns the kind
of controversies which inspired these legal theorists. They believed that the relations
among supranational normative bodies as well as the relations among regional or
subnational authorities should be understood as an actual instantiation of legal
pluralism.18 In this way, international lawyers availed themselves of CLP scholarship
as a toolkit to account for the realities of international and transnational legal orders.19
In this regard, to best penetrate GLP, it is important to juxtapose it with an alternative,
authoritative approach to the proliferation and potential collisions among transna-
tional legal bodies, namely, constitutional pluralism (hereinafter CP).20 This contrast
will allow us to foreground the (truly pluralist) aspiration of GLP to overhaul the
semantic repertoire of legal theory. Despite this, we will claim that a careful scrutiny of
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both reveal that neither CP nor GLP have severed the ties with classic state-based legal
theory (and its limits). In the next two sections, CP and GLP will be explored so as to
demonstrate that not only CP’s answer, but also GLP’s self-defined pluralist one is
disappointingly misleading if assessed against the background of CLP. However,
before proceeding further, a caveat has to be introduced at this stage. The following
analysis will not take into consideration the current systemic approach to legal
pluralism in its many versions21 because its methodology is based on partially different
assumptions and it would not be possible to include this strand into the analysis in a
coherent way. The attention paid by this stream of scholarship to global functional
differentiation, alternative systemic rationalities, the importance of private and
informal actors, and the proliferation of norm-creating sites, makes this approach
impermeable to the criticisms leveled against GLP.22
THE CONSTITUTIONAL VERSION OF LEGAL PLURALISM
A first wave of thinkers who intended to give a pluralist twist to traditional legal theory
emerged out of the need of coping with the porosity of state borders vis-a`-vis
supranational law and in particular in the case of European integration. The latter case
is actually at the origin of CP. The multiplication of sites of authority within the
European legal space was perceived as a controversial legal construction. This became
even more pressing at the moment in which the Maastricht Treaty, along with the
challenges it had to face vis-a`-vis rising public and private actors, took the form of a
CP.23 It was therefore the reaction of the German Constitutional Court to the claims
contained in that Treaty that actually triggered the debate on this form of pluralism
through a seminal article written by Neil McCormick.24 This was clearly interpreted as
a case of conflict among authorities. McCormick resorted to an institutionalist theory
of law in order to account for these ambiguous conflicts.25 What was considered as
pluralistic about European integration was that the EU legal order (taken as an
autonomous one) claimed to hold supremacy over national constitutions against the
opinions of other national constitutional courts. Most of these claims were made by the
European Court of Justice and other national constitutional courts in the course of
deciding particular cases.26 Constitutional and legal theorists have taken these con-
flicts very seriously.27 Over 20 years, the reflections initially advanced by McCormick
have been developed and unpacked by many other scholars and commentators in what
has become an autonomous stream of contemporary legal theory. Neil Walker, the
torch-bearer of this tradition, has offered an epistemic version of CP,28 which claims to
be valid beyond the realm of EU constitutionalism.29 It should be noted that Walker
does not rule out either the explanatory or the normative dimension of CP, for both
flow from epistemic pluralism.30 Pluralism is first and foremost epistemic because it is a
discourse shaped by and through the development of constitutionalism. Its main virtue
lies in its being the least imposing perspective on other first-order points of view. The
accent, again, is on the how of the constitutional discourse rather than on the what and
the who. This is because, as a form of pluralist thinking, the constitutional plura-
list discourse cannot impose substantial principles. It limits itself to providing a thin
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meta-discourse as a shared discursive platform for all legal entities to interact
meaningfully. The deep grammar of Walker’s CP is based on the recognition of a set
of seven standards that betray a specific and circumstantial genealogy. In fact, despite
any allegiance to formal proceduralism, some of these standards do make reference to
substantive contents, whereas others stem from the resolution of actual conflicts
among existing legal orders.31 Finally, the other necessary requirement for this version
of CP establishes that every constitutional site can claim ‘internal sovereignty’, but
cannot claim any superiority vis-a`-vis other constitutional sites. This means that the
novelty of CP has to be seen in the absence of any claim of absolute or supreme authority.
As a way to face the uncertainties generated by the lack of a supreme institution,
Walker’s project is to adapt the language and mindset of constitutionalism to the
pluralist imperatives.
One might wonder why this discourse should successfully vindicate pluralism when
no CP tenets can really ensure that new voices or new subjectivities can actually have
access to the second-order discourse to which Walker makes reference. It is revealing
that, in the end, this thin meta-discourse is compatible with standard forms of
governance as those embodied, for example, by Comitology.32 While the interactions
among different legal regimes can actually produce interesting outcomes in terms of
legal reasoning and interpretation, nothing really ensures that a dialogue among these
established institutions will be able to register voices and subjectivities that are not
expressions of already constituted legal rationalities.
A different version of CP, whose starting point and problems are basically the
same adopted by Walker’s but rests on substantive normative principles, is Mattias
Kumm’s. His argument is clearly underpinned by universalist tones, as it is based on
the following assumption: the philosophical underpinnings of modern constitution-
alism are always the same, despite the change of institutional design, because of the
validity of certain principles that can be deduced with reference to the normative
status of free and equal individuals. Against this larger background, traditional state-
centered constitutional systems assume a more modest significance. Constitu-
tionalism is decoupled from its state template and the state itself remains just one
player in a wider stage.33 Based on this account, Kumm derives a set of universal
constitutional commitments to the principles of legality, subsidiarity, democracy
and rights-protection. In this reading, collisions among different normative claims
are unavoidable because pluralists ‘insist that the different legal orders making
up the world of public law are not hierarchically integrated’.34 The absence
of hierarchy and the recognition of the principles of autonomy and democratic self-
government bring about constitutional collisions and these compose the horizon of
substantive CP.
The answer to these potential conflicts is inspired by the following approach:
[C]onstitutional pluralists insist that different legal orders don’t simply coexist
beside one another, as self-enclosed Leibnizian monads with at best contingent
relationships between them. Notwithstanding the pluralist nature of legal practice,
the relevant actors*and courts in particular*have established mechanisms and
designed doctrines that allow for constructive mutual engagement between
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different legal orders. Legal pluralism [. . .] is guided, constrained, and structured in
a way that justifies describing that practice in constitutional terms, even in the
absence of hierarchical ordering.35
Kumm suggests dealing with them by resorting to a rationality which is immanent
to the practice of modern constitutionalism. In particular, it is in the interplay among
courts, understood as a communicative practice, that pluralism can find expression.
At the same time, the reference to a common template imposes a limit on its
antinomian tendencies. Moreover, in terms of adjudicative practices, pluralism can
be managed through the application of the principle of proportionality.36 The latter
is understood as the third stage of the balancing process where competing rights or
principles are compared and assessed on the basis of a common scale. These two
elements seem to indicate that pluralists defend an institutional conception of law
(to be clear: one based on legal institutions) which shares some important features
with a certain strand of legal positivism. More specifically, Kumm and other
pluralists reject any hierarchy and therefore jettison both legal positivism and legal
monism if these are understood (as in Hans Kelsen’s pure theory) as conditions for
the intelligibility of law. However, the identification of a common juridical space
created by communication among courts and the emphasis on norm-applying
institutions betray strong affinities with H.L.A. Hart’s and Joseph Raz’s conceptions
of the legal system.37 From this perspective, one might reasonably question the
pluralist nature of a type of constitutionalism which is so redolent with the grand
theories of legal monism. Contrary to Walker’s project, in this substantive type of CP
the pluralist element emerges out of constitutional rationality and is therefore already
contained and predetermined by the principles and rules inherited from modern
constitutionalism. MacCormick corrected his original institutional pluralism by
placing it under the banner of a higher law, that is, international law.38 On the
same wavelength, Kumm subsumes pluralism under the higher norm of modern
constitutionalism.
In this respect, both modes of CP aim to keep the tension between constitu-
tionalism and pluralism alive and productive. Yet, given this aim, the promises of this
strand of legal thought can be delivered only as long as none of the two elements
prevail. Therefore, the risk involved in CP is that it will either be colonized by its
constitutional tendencies or will simply be reduced to a form of constitutional
plurality. In the latter scenario, it might well be the case that plurality turns out to be
a way to register the incommensurability of claims between different authorities
whose nature, however, will be determined on the basis of their belonging to an
already existing orderly legal space. That way, the modern constitutionalist logic
prevails over the pluralist aspects in such a way as to reinstate many tenets of legal
monism. Despite any professed commitment to openness, a preference for closure
and reduction to unity finally reappears.39
In the end, the advocates of CL tend to conflate pluralism with a legal scenario
hallmarked by the absence of (institutional) hierarchies. In other words, these legal
theorists identify pluralism with the lack of hierarchy before conflicting rules of
A sense of self-suspicion
7
constitutional supremacy which are to be excluded from the internal perspective
of the sovereign state. In contrast with some of the traditional assumptions of
legal positivists, constitutional pluralists celebrate the absence of a final arbiter having
the last word. Nonetheless, they still accept as a platitude that pluralism is the
outcome of the interaction among different legal institutions whose pedigree can be
reconstructed according to formal sources of law.40
NORMATIVE HYBRIDITY AND RADICAL GLP
A spate of interesting works has been produced as a reaction to CP. Their starting
point is the recognition that constitutionalism in the global age is caught in a
Procrustean dilemma.41 More in particular, the supporters of GLP level two main
criticisms. Firstly, from a heuristic standpoint, constitutionalism fails to account for
the fragmentation of international and global law, in that it still holds onto some of
the tenets of foundational constitutionalism (such as the idea of constituent power
and the recognition of constitutional rights). Secondly, from a theoretical-political
standpoint, when stretched to cover the new legal scenario, it is subject to the
accusation of absence of legitimacy.
An attempt to overcome the limits of CP and to break the spell of modern
constitutionalism has been recently pursued by Paul Schiff Berman and Nico Krisch.
Berman’s methodology is based on the cultural approach to the study of law.42 He
starts off from Clifford Geertz’s observation that law ‘is part of a distinct manner
of imagining the real’.43 Within this framework, law is part and parcel of the
construction of social reality and its analysis cannot be detached from this aspect.
The aim of this kind of enterprise is to retrieve how legal meaning (along with its
condition of intelligibility) is produced rather than to test the criteria of legal validity.
Moving from this basic assumption, Berman postulates that formal sources of law
(on his account, state-based) do not exhaust the role of law in shaping social life. As a
consequence, Berman praises CLP for being the only legal approach to law that takes
into consideration the existence of a multiplicity of legal points of view.44 Legal
pluralism is neither state-centered nor fully cosmopolitan (at least not in the
universalist version of cosmopolitanism). The ideas of an ultimate legal authority and
of state sovereignty (whether national or international) have to be abandoned
precisely because they cannot be supported either by legal fictions or by factual
monopoly of power. Global law and the proliferation of legal sites at the
supranational level offer new incentives to fuel legal imagination and to foster the
generative role of contemporary law.
Accordingly, the task of GLP is to offer a reconstruction of the legal meaning
generated within these contexts. This leads Berman to the recognition that ‘we live in
a world of multiple overlapping normative communities’.45 This means that a
multiplicity of legal orders are in principle legitimized to claim the right to regulate
the same social field or the same activity. He defines this condition as normative or
legal hybridity. No clear definition is provided for this notion, but it can be described
as the phenomenon of ‘the relationship among multiple communities and their
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decision makers’.46 The examples offered by Berman are several: from state vs. state
conflict to state vs. international norms and state vs. non-state law. Legal hybridity is
first and foremost a de facto reality with which it is necessary to come to terms.
Nonetheless, Berman’s GLP is even more ambitious, as it advances stronger claims
than merely descriptive ones. It is indeed a normative theory because it praises the
virtues of a pluralist understanding of legal interactions. As Berman points out:
[W]e need to realize that normative conflict among multiple, overlapping legal
systems is unavoidable and might even sometimes be desirable, both as a source
of alternative ideas and as a site for discourse among multiple community
affiliations.47
What are the main virtues of this form of GLP? The first is epistemic. Recognizing
the multiplicity of legal sources beyond the state entails respecting social groups as
autonomous creators of law and acknowledging their legal impact. The second main
virtue is that, according to Berman, this form of pluralism is empowering insofar as it
creates new opportunities for contestation and creative adaptation.48 Berman believes
that pluralism should help cope with the phenomenon of hybridity through procedural
and not substantive means. Since normativity is pervasive and the production of legal
meanings relentless, substantive principles have to yield to normative proceduralism.49
No agreement on the contents of substantive principles is indeed possible. The
recognition of this state of affairs is a crucial step in the response to legal hybridity:
[T]o create or preserve spaces for productive interaction among multiple, over-
lapping legal systems by developing procedural mechanisms, institutions, and
practices that aim to manage, without eliminating, the legal pluralism we see
around us.50
GLP is thus conceived as a tool for managing legal hybridity by devising
procedures in which the voices of different communities can be heard. Berman
claims that this approach is likely to tame conflicts among staunchly diverse and
contrasting views of different legal orders. Much as Berman concedes that these
procedures are not completely formal, he contends that they cannot decide any issue
by introducing only substantive reasons. As noted by Alexis Gala´n and Dennis
Patterson, this requirement not only weakens Berman’s GLP, but makes it depend
on a liberal political philosophy.51 Not every new voice is legitimate, but only those
that put forward reasonable arguments. Berman’s examples are quite telling, for they
all point to interactions between different sites of authority or institutional power and
rarely discuss informal (that is to say, social, not institutional) movements. Overall,
Berman’s GLP turns out to be an instrumental version of liberal pluralism whose
main point is that institutional procedures must be devised to govern problematic
interactions among different layers of legal orders. The fact that the interacting
institutions do not have to be attached to state legal systems hardly makes Berman’s
theory an authentic specimen of legal pluralism.
A further (allegedly) radical version of GLP comes from the experience of global
administrative law. In an effort to get rid of the normalizing and oppressive tenets of
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modern constitutional law, Nico Krisch suggests the time has come to recognize that
‘different layers of law in the postnational order no longer operate in separate spheres
but are deeply intertwined’.52 Krisch’s main contribution to this debate is that
pluralism does not only serve as a prism for understanding the structure of law, for it
also provides the best normative perspective. Such a radical GLP has three main
virtues: revisability, contestation, and checks and balances. Revisability is ensured by
the lack of ultimate authority and it marks the pluralist character of what Krisch
defines as the ‘postnational legal order’, while checks and balances are operational
through the proliferation of sites of authority. However, for our purposes in this
article, contestation is the most interesting virtue. Openness to contestation is
supposed to be the radical aspect of GLP and to ensure that accountability is
properly in place in the interaction among different legal orders and institutions.
Only through contestation is it possible to counter the lack of trust that is engendered
by the absence of a direct representative link between supranational institutions and
social agents, that is, between the governing supranational institutions and those
governed. Moreover, only through contestation does it become possible for legal
networks to register previously excluded voices.
In the light of Krisch’s discussion of instantiations of contestation in GLP (e.g.
genetically modified organisms disputes between the EU and the WTO, conflicts on
security between UN and EU) it might seem that he rather adopts a conflict-of-laws
perspective.53 Nonetheless, his allegiance to GLP commits him to an admittedly
stronger stance. The conflict-of-laws approach understands the relations between
different legal claims as a conflict between autonomous orders with a neat distinction
between inside and outside.54 GLP’s starting point is different because it is
concerned with orders that are intermeshed and interconnected, and accept forms
of common decision-making. This is reflected in Krisch’s terminology: interactions at
the supranational level are not regulated by collision between norms, but by
‘interface norms’ which signal enmeshment and joint engagement in a common
space. For courts, for example, this means to move from a self-perception as the
guardians of their legal orders to the role of mediators or arbiters between orders,
because they are party at one and the same time to many legal orders and therefore
are at one and the same time the bearers of multiple identities.
In order to assess the nature of this kind of legal pluralism it is necessary to analyze
the interface norms which are supposed to regulate the conflicts ensuing from
different legal standpoints. Krisch states that interface norms are based on the
principle of public autonomy:
[These norms] will also reflect other factors, such as the degree of prior formal
acceptance of other norms (for example, through ratification), the proximity of
values (for example, equivalence or identity in the interpretation of rights), or
functional considerations, such as the utility of cooperation in a regime. Yet, these
should be secondary factors, operating within the autonomy-based framework I
have just outlined. If a polity has a strong autonomy pedigree, its norms are due
respect even if they are based on distinct values or compliance with them does not
have immediate benefits.55
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In the face of it, a crucial question remains: How will different claims from various
legal standpoints be adjudicated? Krisch’s reliance on the principle of public autonomy
reveals itself to be a liberal answer to the issue of pluralism. Conflict rules do not have
an overarching legal character, but are ‘normative, moral demands that find
(potentially diverging) legal expressions only within the various sub-orders’.56 How
these demands are put forward and then channeled is a question which is left largely
unexplored, except for the treatment of adjudicative processes. Predictably, Krisch’s
solution is very close to the one proposed by global administrative law. Courts and
regulatory bodies are the best-suited agents for dealing with these conflicts for two
reasons. First, basically it is a matter of institutional design. In the process of
interpreting the law, courts often collect claims from different legal orders, which is less
often the case in other institutional sites. The idea is that, by doing so, courts provide a
common space that endows parties with a speaking position. Accordingly, contestation
can take place and be articulated in keeping with a thin common grammar. The second
reason is that legal interpretation provides a common language well-equipped for
dealing with contestation. As a matter of fact, Krisch admits that judicial minimalism is
often the right attitude to issues of social and political conflict relative to global
governance. He suggests taking up a case-by-case evolutionary, but minimalist,
approach to legal interpretation. Given that it is not always easy to reconcile conflicting
claims, decisions should refrain from addressing principles and should be restricted to
the circumstances of the particular case without developing any wider theory of law.
While the original inspiration behind Krisch’s GLP was the recognition of different
actors through the judicial channel,57 the innovative aspect of this approach is that it
creates new possibilities for actors in spheres from which they were previously
excluded. Nevertheless, he says nothing about whether and to what extent the judicial
language colonizes political action and obfuscates the visibility of alternative legalities.
Despite the claims of being a theory of systemic pluralism, Krisch’s concern for the
structure of global governance and his emphasis on inter-institutional conflicts take the
edge out of the approach.
As was the case with CP, both Berman’s and Krisch’s GLP fail to take up CLP’s
lesson.58 Both theories fall prey of a major concern with the structure of global
governance and the maintenance of its order, and thus prove unable to address the
issue of who recognizes what and which are the epistemic tools employed in the
process of recognition.
THE SYMBOLIC ASPECT OF NORMATIVE PHENOMENA
The exponents of CLP are certainly more cautious about the emancipatory and
redeeming force of the plurality of legal orders. With few exceptions,59 they by and
large believe legal pluralism possesses nothing inherently progressive or obscurantist.
If for the time being we leave aside relevant theoretical differences, we can see that
they all generally consider pluralism as nothing other than the direct upshot of a
better comprehension of legal phenomena. Yet, as far as the aim of the present article
is concerned, their commitment to non-evaluative accounts provides the grounds for
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raising a misgiving: What if the access to the arena where legal orders are recognized
as such, and thus can freely compete and interact with one another, is not as open as
global legal pluralists appear to believe? In the light of this misgiving, the crucial
question is what normative orderings qualify as legal orders and thus can claim to get
access to the global arena as legitimate players. All in all, if it is the very access to the
global arena that makes a legal order a legitimate player, then this access comes to
exert legitimizing effects on legal orders. What if this access, after all, ends up
ratifying the status quo where powerful and well-equipped legal orders mutually
recognize each other and perform an activity whereby they decide who can join the
club? To put it bluntly, are the organized collectivities of South-American peasants,
or the mobilizing groups of dispossessed land-tenures, to be regarded as legiti-
mate legal players in the field of global law? Most likely, most advocates of GLP
would quickly provide an affirmative answer. The key question, however, is if the
theory they develop allows them to do so from a conceptual viewpoint. We believe it
does not.
This question has a symbolic significance that, in our interpretation, GLP tends to
neglect.60 To tackle it we would like to go back to the issue we raised at the very
outset, that is, the degree of self-suspicion that characterizes one’s theory. It is worth
relying on some key authors of CLP who have been alert to the relevance of this issue
since the very beginning of the debate on legal pluralism. In our reading, in their
writings two key aspects are given particular emphasis.
The first aspect is the theoretical instrument with which the legal character of a
normative ordering can be ascertained. In the 1970s and the 1980s the debate over
legal pluralism revolved around the question of what can be properly defined ‘law’
and what normative entities should be attributed the qualification of ‘legal’.
Famously, the same question was haunting legal philosophy, where scholars were
concerned with the Hart-Kelsen and above all the Hart-Dworkin debates.61
However, a crucial difference between the two types of investigation should be
stressed. In keeping with the project pursued by John Austin, one of the founding
fathers of jurisprudence, legal philosophers aspired to discover the ‘key to the
sciences of jurisprudence and morals’62 in order to establish once and for all what
law in general is. By doing so, they were hoping to be able to determine what makes
a given system legal, irrespective of cultural and geo-historical differences. Quite the
reverse, legal anthropologists who wanted to penetrate the way of life of non-Western
populations were concerned about potential distortions introduced by a Western-
biased, culture-specific theoretical toolkit. The use of the jurisprudential lexicon
available at the time, whose main elements were, for example, rules, authority,
system, and coercion, ran the risk of projecting on the observed social realities
something that the latter had neither knowledge nor experience of. Anthropologists
feared the illusion of a theoretical projection whereby they could make sense of
an observed population with tools that were completely alien to it. The result would
be a distorted, unreal portrayal of the observed population, which reflected the
convictions of the observer rather than the concrete dynamics of the population.
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Paradoxically, legal pluralists’ preoccupation with this risk is attested by one of the
fiercest critiques of CLP, Simon Roberts’s Against Legal Pluralism.63 In this short but
robust article, Roberts aims to debunk the need for such a thing as a pluralist view of
law as he claims it is a distortion introduced by lawyers. Lawyers see law everywhere
and are prone to believe that every normative entity involving rules and procedures
should be defined as ‘legal’. In doing so, they neglect some key aspects of both
Western law and non-Western normative repertoires. In reality, such a concern has
crossed the history of 20th-century social sciences, since it has to do with the fine line
between observation and objectivation. The glance of the observer as well as the
model of the theorist always risk reifying a given entity by investing it with the
presuppositions that nurture the observer’s and the theorist’s approach to reality.
Both the observer and the theorist tend to superimpose what Pierre Bourdieu calls a
‘logic’ or a ‘generative formula’, that is to say, a set of independent and coherent
axioms that they elaborate to make sense of their object of study.64
Whether or not this critique is applicable to some formulations of legal pluralism
(and most likely it is), the persistence of this debate among legal anthropologists
attests to their sensitivity to this issue. Most of them believed that the perils of a
theoretical colonization on the part of Western scholarship should be avoided with
recourse to alternative instruments of inquiry. Claiming that all normative orderings
were legal merely because they possessed rules, authorities and procedures could get
them to obliterate important nuances. This is why two tutelary deities of legal
pluralism like Moore and Merry were adamant that some sort of distinction between
state law and other normative phenomena should be preserved. Moore avers that,
much as there might be striking similarities between state law and a given normative
ordering, ‘there are occasions when [. . .] it may be of importance to distinguish
the sources of the rules and the sources of effective inducement and coercion’.65
Merry believes ‘it is essential to see state law as fundamentally different [from all
other types of social ordering] in that it exercises the coercive power of the state and
monopolises the symbolic power associated with state authority. But, in many ways,
it ideologically shapes other normative orders as well as provides an inescapable
framework for their practice’.66
Some more radical advocates of CLP have interpreted these remarks as a reversion
to a centralist view.67 We rather believe that these junctures bespeak a major concern
as to the risk that a theory might claim to possess all that is necessary to determine
what law is and what is not regardless of cultural and geo-historical variables: such an
abstractive approach could induce the theorist to draw up (whether inadvertently or
not) a list of admissible candidates. In other words, Moore’s and Merry’s is a
methodological caveat. This positively impacted on CLP, where scholars were
conscious from the very beginning of the risks of objectification, whether they
espoused an extreme or a milder pluralism. This leads us to discuss the second aspect
brought into light by prominent representatives of CLP. In fact, this methodological
caveat is inextricably linked to the aspect of symbolic power. While discussing the
differences between state law and other normative orderings, Merry points out ‘it is
essential to see state law as fundamentally different in that it exercises the coercive
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power of the state and monopolizes the symbolic power associated with state
authority’.68 This juncture lays bare the key relation between material and symbolic
power, whereby state’s monopoly on force is not as important in terms of menace
and dissuasion as it is in terms of people’s perception of something as law. In other
words, a pivotal element for a normative ordering to be legal is the general perception
of its pre-emptive character. If this is true, then the source of law’s capacity to
override the rules of other normative orderings does not lie in its normative
structure. For it is a much more complex process*external to the normative
structure of law in terms of rules and procedures*that confers a legal value on a
specific normative ordering.
This point is stressed by Marc Galanter when he claims that the way in which the
label ‘law’ is used can be subject of controversy. His argument reads as follows: legal
reality is by no means a homogeneous body of rules and procedures established by
state agencies. As Galanter reveals with reference to many actual cases and disputes
where the law is hardly or partially involved, the area where the law develops and
lives is composed of partially self-regulating fields or sectors, organized along spatial,
transactional or ethnic-familial lines, ranging from primary groups in which relations
are direct, immediate and diffuse to settings in which relations are indirect, mediated
and specialized. Galanter’s suggestion is a refined one. He does not claim that the use
of the label ‘law’ is straightforwardly arbitrary or mistaken. He maintains that using
‘law’ for distinguishing between official and unofficial orderings in a particular geo-
historical context is always the outcome of a struggle over meaning in which there are
winners and losers, and where the group of losers is composed of all those unofficial
orderings which might be properly seen as having a ‘law’ but are considered as
unofficial due to the primacy of their rivals. In this light, Galanter eventually
concludes that Western state legal systems are nothing other than ‘institutional
intellectual complexes’ that claim ‘to encompass and control all the other institutions
in the society and to subject them to a regime of general rules [. . .]. These complexes
consolidated and displaced the earlier diverse array of normative orderings in society,
reducing them to a subordinate and interstitial status’.69
THE POLITICS OF DEFINITION
Based on the analysis above, what makes GLP a radical form of liberalism rather
than the genuine heir of CLP is a basic concern with the symbolic power of
definition. The idea that in the global theatre every form of ordering can in principle
lay a claim to legal authority over a given field or population neglects the issues of
who has the material and symbolic power to lay this claim, what the sources of this
power are, and in what ways this claim could and should be raised. A serious worry is
that the primary source of this power is the very same ordering’s ability to ‘speak’ the
language of global law and to have its claim heard by the actors who are already
recognized as legitimate legal players. More in particular, the supposition that an
ordering’s claim to have some sort of legal authority is a neutral one is flawed, since
those who claim legal authority are de facto required to agree on the jargon that makes
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their claim intelligible, and thus to use this jargon to couch their stance. In this
respect, it is worth mentioning an example discussed by Gordon Woodman in a pithy
defence of CLP apropos of the relationship between colonial laws and pre-colonial
customary practices. Woodman writes:
Towards the end of the nineteenth century the British colonial government
proposed that vacant, unowned lands should be vested in the British Crown. The
proposal was resisted by local interest groups. To make the resistance politically
effective, it was necessary to express the grounds of opposition in terms which would
accord with the law of the colonial state. It appears that the representatives of the
indigenous communities then restated their customary laws to claim that the
communities themselves were the owners of land which was currently unoccupied
and unused. The owner of any such land was the nearest community, it was said,
and where an area of unused land lay between two communities, there was under
customary law a common boundary running midway between their settlements.
And so there was invented a doctrine of customary law which held that there was no
unowned land. The argument was politically successful and the proposal to vest
vacant lands in the Crown was abandoned. It seems clear that the threat had led to
a reformulation of customary law in terms which were remote from the norms
observed in practice.70
On the one hand, this example intends to exalt the flexibility of normative regimes
and their capacity to adapt to mutable circumstances. This image of normativity can
well be squared with GLP’s celebration of the morphing nature of normative
practices, which are getting out of the bounded sphere of state system and are taking
unpredictable configurations. On the other hand, however, to engage in the
successful negotiation described by Woodman, the customary practice had to yield
to the law of the colonizers. The population had no vocabulary of its own to claim
possession of the land and had no idea whatsoever of Western property rights. In the
end, the only possibility for the colonized population to make their case was to adopt
the lexicon of colonial law*one that was alien to their indigenous experience*and
to subsume their normative categories regime under the categories of English law. In
this small-scale theatre, the weak and worse-off actually voiced a strong claim
through law and turned out to be successful. But success came at a price.71
When assessed against the background of CLP, it is evident that what GLP omits
to bring into question is the very legal frame, or rather, the instruments, language,
procedures and categories that allow such thing as legal pluralism to exist. In doing
so, GLP takes the legal for granted, whereas ‘the legal’ is already a politically, non-
neutral approach to the bare reality of conflicts. The pluralism that the advocates
of GLP speak of is always-and-already addressed as legal, with the politically
cumbersome consequence that only those who qualify as legal actors can have a say in
the legal discourse. GLP’s failure to account for what comes before a legal-pluralist
scenario is put in place, or rather, its tendency to regard the plurality of laws as a
social datum is on a par with traditional legal positivists’ tendency to search for legal
systems in non-Western indigenous realities and to measure their degree of civility on
that basis. Both see their tendency as open-minded, universalistic and progressive,
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while neither realize that their very approach to social reality makes certain entities
invisible and theoretically unspeakable.
In conclusion, CLP still serves as a noble warning about the lack of self-suspicion.
It urges legal and political theorists to adopt a doubly critical approach: to their
subject and to the lens through which they look at it. In this respect, CLP should
rather be regarded as a critical exploration into the tacit presuppositions of one’s
theorizing, which orients and prompts one’s analysis to emphasize certain aspects
and to overlook others. If this is so, then it does make sense, at least at present, to pit
CLP against GLP.
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